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INTRODUCTION: THE FRIEND OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND 
lemming Rose has been a pivotal person in the European 
debate over hate speech bans. As culture page editor of 
Jyllands-Posten, Rose commissioned and ran the Danish car-
toons in 2005 as a statement against what he saw as “self-
censorship.”1 Since then he has toured the world justifying his 
                                                                                                                                     
* B.A., Columbia University; J.D., New York University School of Law; Ph.D. 
in Political Science from Johns Hopkins University. Associate Professor of 
Law, University of St. Thomas (Minnesota). I would like to thank Jacqueline 
Baronian, Mitchell Gordon, Julie Oseid, Douglas Dow, and Robert Vischer for 
their helpful comments.  
 1. For an overview of the cartoon crisis, see JYTTE KLAUSEN, THE 
CARTOONS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD (2009). I discuss Rose’s motivations to run 
the cartoons in Robert A. Kahn, Flemming Rose, the Danish Cartoon Contro-
F
658 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:2 
decision and calling for an abolition of hate speech laws.2 More 
recently, he has put forth an extended theory of hate speech 
regulation in his memoir, The Tyranny of Silence (2010).3 In a 
short but rich fifteen-page English-language excerpt, Rose dis-
cusses the Danish cartoon controversy, recounts a conversation 
with Salman Rushdie, and explains how hate speech bans facil-
itated the Nazi rise to power during the period of the Weimar 
Republic.4 But the pride of place in Rose’s narrative goes to the 
Soviet Union.5 Defending speech is a matter of opposing Soviet-
style censorship—a censorship Rose sees in European Islam-
ists.6 As a result, he views supporters of hate speech bans 
against Islamophobic speech as the new appeasers.7 
One of the most striking things about Rose’s excerpt, howev-
er, is what he does not discuss. As I write this essay, I am sit-
ting in St. Paul, Minnesota. In 1992, the United States Su-
preme Court struck down a St. Paul ordinance banning cross 
                                                                                                                                     
versy, and the New European Freedom of Speech, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 243, 
260–63 (2009–10) [hereinafter Kahn, Flemming Rose]. 
 2. Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 263–65. 
 3. FLEMMING ROSE, TAVSHEDENS TYRANNI [THE TYRANNY OF SILENCE] 
(2010). While the book is currently available in only Danish, Norwegian, and 
Russian, Rose has translated a fifteen-page English-language excerpt cover-
ing the first two chapters. See Flemming Rose, Read an Excerpt of the Book, 
TYRANNY OF SILENCE (Dec. 30, 2010), 
http://www.tyrannyofsilence.net/page5/files/7f96eb2af2602318f4829282100ccf
99-0.html [hereinafter Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt)]. According to 
the website, Rose’s book describes “the people and experiences that have in-
fluenced the way he views the world and his understanding of the crisis.” 
Flemming Rose, Tyranny of Silence, TYRANNY OF SILENCE, 
http://www.tyrannyofsilence.net/index.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2013). The 
website also contains a review of the book from Leif Davidsen of Jyllands-
Posten giving the book five stars and calling it “a study in the anatomy of 
fear.” Critics and Reviews, TYRANNY OF SILENCE, 
http://www.tyrannyofsilence.net/page2/page2.html (last visited Nov. 18, 
2013). For additional background on Rose’s book, see Gina Gustavsson, Ro-
mantic Liberalism: An Alternative Perspective on Liberal Disrespect in the 
Muhammad Cartoons Controversy, 62 POL. STUD. 53 (2013). Gustavsson, a 
researcher at the University of Uppsala, views Rose an exemplar of a “ro-
mantic” liberalism under which the cartoons are an act of self-expression ra-
ther than an effort to bring Danish Muslims into the modern era. Id. at 10–
11. 
 4. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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burning.8 Rose did not mention this decision in his excerpt. Nor 
did he mention Brandenburg v. Ohio,9 New York Times v. Sul-
livan,10 or the famous speech-affirming dissents and concur-
rences of Justices Holmes and Brandeis.11 In 2007, Robert Post, 
one of the most prolific American writers on the subject of hate 
speech, wrote an article in the journal Constellations arguing 
that a truly democratic society would not ban the Danish car-
toons.12 Flemming Rose did not mention him either, even 
though there is some overlap between Robert Post’s public-
discourse-based justification of speech and Rose’s own argu-
ment that running the cartoons would help incorporate Mus-
lims into Danish society.13 
The omission of American arguments about freedom of 
speech is confusing. Rose is opposed to European hate speech 
bans.14 The American First Amendment doctrine, at least since 
the 1969 Brandenburg decision, also rejects hate speech bans, 
as do many American legal academics. For example, Post ar-
gues that hate speech laws threaten the public dialogue neces-
sary for a legitimate democracy,15 while Eugene Volokh, de-
scribing anti-Communist cases of the 1940s and 1950s, warns 
his readers of the folly of balancing speech against other 
                                                                                                                                     
 8. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). For an inside account of 
the case, see EDWARD CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS: A LANDMARK CASE 
OF RACE, CENSORSHIP AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1995). 
 9. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 10. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 11. E.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 356, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
 12. Robert Post, Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Muhammad, 
14 CONSTELLATIONS 72 (2007) [hereinafter Post, Religion and Freedom of 
Speech]. 
 13. Both Post and Rose view speech as a means of inclusiveness. For Post, 
the free public discourse renders the democratic process legitimate to the 
losers of a legislative vote or an election. See Robert Post, Racist Speech, De-
mocracy and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 282–83 
(1991) [hereinafter Post, Racist Speech]. For Rose, inclusion of Muslims into 
the Danish public discourse was one intended result of publishing the car-
toons. See Flemming Rose, Why I Published the Muhammad Cartoons, 
SPIEGEL ONLINE (May 31, 2006),  
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/opinion-why-i-published-the-
muhammad-cartoons-a-418930.html [hereinafter Rose, Why I Published the 
Muhammad Cartoons]. 
 14. Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 265–66. 
 15. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 13, at 279–83. 
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rights.16 Others, such as Peter Teachout, go so far as to criticize 
specific types of European hate speech laws, such as bans on 
Holocaust denial.17 
Moreover, Rose has spent a great deal of time in the United 
States. From 1996 to 1999 he was the Washington, D.C. corre-
spondent for Jyllands-Posten, and in the wake of the Danish 
cartoon controversy he traveled to the United States repeated-
ly.18 As such, he must have been aware of these arguments, 
even if not in the precise form expressed by Post, Volokh, and 
Teachout.19 Usually the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Yet 
Rose refused to make common cause with American opponents 
of European hate speech laws. 
Clearly, something in the American free speech story was not 
culturally appealing to Flemming Rose. On one level, this ob-
servation is unremarkable. Just as Robert Delahunty and John 
Yoo argue against U.S. courts adopting foreign law,20 Flem-
ming Rose is not at fault for ignoring the American First 
Amendment canon in explaining a controversy that arose in 
Denmark. Rose’s emphasis on the Soviet Union and his discus-
sion with Rushdie, however, suggest that something more may 
be at play. The problem is not simply that the American speech 
canon is insufficiently Danish. Instead, Rose ignored the Amer-
ican free speech canon because, as currently constructed, the 
canon simply does not speak to his situation—that of a free 
speech agent provocateur compelled to publish offensive mate-
rial to ward off self-censorship. 
Rose’s rejection of the American free speech canon as inade-
quate—regardless of why he did it—poses a puzzle for compar-
ative legal scholars. One leading theory, neo-functionalism,21 
emphasizes doctrinal problems—scholars, judges, and other 
                                                                                                                                     
 16. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension 
Method, 3 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 223, 238–39 (1996). 
 17. Peter R. Teachout, Making “Holocaust Denial” a Crime: Reflections on 
European Anti-negationist Laws from the Perspective of U.S. Constitutional 
Experience, 30 VT. L. REV. 655, 690–91 (2006). 
 18. Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 265–67 (describing Rose’s trips 
to the United States). 
 19. This is especially likely given that Rose worked as a journalist. 
 20. See generally Robert Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 291 (2005). 
 21. See Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2571, 2574 (2007) (book review) (describing functionalism as 
“the preeminent approach to comparative law” for “generations”). 
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actors seek out the best solutions to legal problems, regardless 
of where they may be.22 Yet Rose, at the center of a free speech 
controversy, ignored one of the deepest sources of free speech 
doctrine. Another tenet of comparative scholars is that over 
time, the legal doctrine across the globe on a given issue like 
free speech will converge on shared norms.23 But, as we shall 
see, Rose’s theory diverges from the American canon in several 
respects.24 Is Rose simply a poor theorist? Or is The Tyranny of 
Silence excerpt proof that the global debate over free speech 
theory is more diverse than the convergence scholars suggest it 
should be? 
The rest of this essay explores these questions. Part I gives a 
rough sketch of the American free speech canon. The canon is a 
narrative, deeply rooted in American history, which separates 
the bad times of censorship from the golden ages of speech pro-
tection. It also includes a set of maxims—morals derived from 
the stories such as the marketplace of ideas metaphor and the 
slippery slope argument. These maxims make the protection of 
speech appear natural—at least to Americans. 
Part II turns to the excerpt from The Tyranny of Silence and 
a recent article, “Words and Deeds,” published in the Index on 
Censorship.25 In the place of the American canon, Rose ad-
vanced a highly personal theory, one remarkably free from 
doubt and heavily reliant on the Soviet Union as an anti-
Utopia.26 A key argument—that “man” is an inherently story-
telling animal—comes from Salman Rushdie, whose novel, The 
Satanic Verses, itself led to a controversy over the limits of 
speech.27 Rose also discussed the relationship between freedom 
of speech and the Holocaust.28 While Americans and Europeans 
                                                                                                                                     
 22. Id. 
 23. The emphasis on convergence is even true of scholars, like Ruti Teitel, 
who take a more discursive approach to comparative constitutionalism. Id. at 
2586 (arguing that “comparativism offers the potential for global solidarity”). 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. Flemming Rose, Words and Deeds, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP (Apr. 10, 
2012), available at http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2012/04/words-and-
deeds/ [hereinafter Rose, Words and Deeds]. 
 26. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3. 
 27. Id. For an overview of the Rushdie affair, see RICHARD WEBSTER, A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF BLASPHEMY: LIBERALISM, CENSORSHIP AND ‘THE SATANIC 
VERSES’ (1990). 
 28. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3; Rose, Words and 
Deeds, supra note 25. 
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have debated whether hate speech laws could have stopped the 
Nazi rise to power, Rose goes a step further and sees hate 
speech bans as responsible for the Holocaust itself.29 Mean-
while, Rose says very little about the American free speech 
canon. 
Part II also briefly looks at what Rose does say about Ameri-
ca. He briefly discusses slavery and sprinkles his pages with 
quotes from American rock and roll icons like Bruce Spring-
steen and Bob Dylan,30 a fact that raises even more questions 
about his failure to cite the free speech canon. 
Part III takes up the implications of Rose’s neglect of the 
American free speech canon in The Tyranny of Silence excerpt 
for comparative constitutional theory. The neo-functionalist 
theory of comparison cannot explain Rose’s refusal to adopt a 
vast body of American jurisprudence that largely supported his 
right to run the Danish cartoons. At its most basic, Rose’s ne-
glect of the American canon reflects the truism of Clifford 
Geertz and Tip O’Neil that all politics—and speech theory—is 
local.31 
Rose’s excerpt also poses a challenge to those, like Ruti Tei-
tel, who see doctrinal law converging on a common set of 
norms.32 He rejected the American canon for a more speech-
friendly, samizdat alternative based on the daring speaker who 
stirs the pot to unsettle a slowly creeping, Soviet-style self-
censorship.33 This is significant doctrinally—for once, the Unit-
ed States might not be on the absolutist fringe of the debate 
over hate speech regulation. It is also significant theoretically 
because it suggests that there is more than one coherent liber-
tarian position to take. 
The essay concludes with a call to incorporate identity theory 
in the study of comparative constitutional law and to view de- 
                                                                                                                                     
 29. Rose, Words and Deeds, supra note 25. 
 30. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3. 
 31. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN 
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 218 (1983). 
 32. Teitel, supra note 21, at 2586–87. 
 33. The term samizdat was “coined to describe the system of underground 
publishing in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union.” Ann Komaromi, The Material 
Existence of Soviet Samizdat, 63 SLAVIC REV. 597, 597 (2004). More generally, 
the term describes “any clandestine production and circulation of texts.” Id. 
During the Cold War, the term signified “political opposition and heroic dis-
sidence.” Id. More recently, this framing has become less relevant. Id. 
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bates over a contested area of doctrine—such as hate speech 
regulation—as an endless conversation rather than a linear 
march to a world-wide agreement.34 
I. THE CLASSIC STORY OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 
Identifying the “classic” First Amendment story of speech is a 
difficult task. Each generation has its own account of the First 
Amendment. What figures in the canon might be different in 
1919 (or 1969) than it is today. Moreover, the First Amendment 
protection of speech means different things to different people. 
A sympathizer of the antiwar and civil rights movements of the 
1960s might view the “worthy tradition” differently from some-
one who views him or herself as a likely victim of hate speech.35 
But there is some overlap. Writing in the wake of the Danish 
cartoon controversy, Post refers to the ban on the teaching of 
communism as a “classic historical example” of American skep-
ticism of hate speech laws36—the same point raised by Vo-
lokh.37 For example, both Post and Volokh see the American 
                                                                                                                                     
 34. My conclusions rest on the fifteen-page English-language excerpt from 
The Tyranny of Silence. In the Danish portion of the book, Rose mentions 
some American free speech authors, including Aryeh Neier, James Weinstein, 
and Ronald Dworkin. These passages are quite brief. See ROSE, TAVSHEDENS 
TYRANNI, supra note 3, at 252–54 (discussing Neier), 266–67 (discussing 
Weinstein), 272–74 (discussing Dworkin). He also briefly discusses Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s “fire in a crowded theater” metaphor. Id. at 279–80. These 
passages, however, do not undermine the conclusion that Rose has largely 
ignored the American free speech canon. For one thing, the passages them-
selves make up at most five to ten pages of a 478-page book, a fact that shows 
Rose’s ability to construct a free speech theory largely without reference to 
the American canon. Not only that, with the exception of the “fire in a crowd-
ed theater” passage, Rose does not discuss any of the classic American free 
speech cases. Indeed, he appears to have come to the fire metaphor through 
the work of Alan Dershowitz. Id. at 471. So while Rose mentions some Ameri-
can legal academics, he largely stays away from the classic cases themselves. 
A review of Rose’s index reveals a sharp contrast between the brief mention 
of the American canon, with much lengthier discussions of Salman Rushdie 
and the Soviet Union. Id. at 489–90. Finally, as we shall see, the fifteen-page 
excerpt departs from the substance of the American canon in several key re-
spects. See infra Part II. 
 35. This underscores the importance of politics in setting out the bounda-
ries of speech protection, something Samuel Walker observed in his study of 
hate speech regulation. See SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF 
AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 1–16 (1994). 
 36. Post, Religion and Freedom of Speech, supra note 12, at 83. 
 37. Volokh, supra note 16, at 233–34. 
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experience with anti-Communist laws in the 1940s and 1950s 
as formative to the nation’s understanding of how speech pro-
tection works.38 One can compile these areas of overlap into a 
general narrative, one that divides into four main periods.39 
First, after a brief libertarian awakening following the rejec-
tion of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the country settled into a 
long period during which speech restrictions were acceptable, 
provided that the speech in question was associated with a 
“bad tendency.”40 In the early nineteenth century, southern 
states banned abolitionist speech; later on, speech prosecutions 
targeted union members and advocates like Moses Harmon of 
the free love movement.41 These were the dark ages of Ameri-
can speech regulation—an unhappy time to which no modern 
American wishes to return.42 
Second, after 1919, things began to change. Justices Holmes 
and Brandeis, in a series of stirring dissents and concurrences, 
began to articulate a new, more speech-friendly doctrine—
speech restrictions were only permissible when there was a 
“clear and present danger.”43 If at first this was a minority po-
sition, by the 1930s “speech [had begun] to win” in a series of 
Supreme Court opinions.44 A number of the strongest free 
speech tropes date from this period—including Justice 
Holmes’s placing the limit on speech at yelling fire in a crowd-
                                                                                                                                     
 38. Volokh opens his article with a discussion of Communism and returns 
to it repeatedly. Id. at 223, 233–34. For his part, Post refers to restrictions on 
Communist speech as a “classic historical example” of government abuse of 
free speech rights. See Post, Religion and Freedom of Speech, supra note 12, 
at 83. 
 39. What follows draws on HARRY KALVEN JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988); WALKER, supra note 35. 
 40. For an overview of the debate over the Alien and Sedition Acts, see 
JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1951). 
 41. See CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOM-OF-THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD 
SOUTH (1964) (describing restrictions on abolitionist speech). For an enter-
taining study of the Moses Harmon trial, see Charles J. Reid Jr., The Devil 
Comes to Kansas: A Story of Free Love, Sexual Privacy, and the Law, 19 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 71 (2012). 
 42. There were, to be sure, some victories for speech before Holmes and 
Brandeis. For more, see DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN 
YEARS, 1879–1920 (1999). 
 43. For a discussion of the clear and present danger test, see infra note 48. 
 44. For an overview, see KALVEN, supra note 39, at 168–78. 
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ed theater,45 and Justice Brandeis’s adage that the best re-
sponse to bad speech was more speech.46 This was the first 
golden age. 
Just as it appeared that the clear and present danger doc-
trine47 would carry the day, there was a relapse. This third pe-
riod was defined as a time when the twin perils of fascism and 
communism led to a great concern about protecting the state 
against internal subversion. Here, Post and Volokh rightly 
point to Dennis v. United States48 where the Supreme Court 
upheld the convictions of twelve members of the New York 
Communist Party whose sole offense was to teach the doctrine 
of Marxism-Leninism.49 The case is famous for the idea that 
the immediacy of the danger can be discounted by “the gravity 
of the evil”50—a formulation that took the air out of the “clear 
and present danger” test and suggested a return to the dark 
ages of “bad tendency.”51 This was a time of loyalty oaths and 
                                                                                                                                     
 45. For more, see id. at 130–36. Interestingly, Justice Holmes made his 
famous “fire in a crowded theater” comment in Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47, 52 (1919), an opinion that upheld a speech restriction. Schenck is 
also the source of the “clear and present danger” test. Id. 
 46. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 356, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring).  
 47. The term, originally used as a restriction on speech, allows for re-
strictions when there is a “clear” and “present” danger of harm. See Schenck, 
249 U.S. at 52 (upholding a conviction under the Espionage Act). With 
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, however, the term became asso-
ciated with protection of speech. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The doctrine peaked in the 1940s as the Su-
preme Court used the test in a variety of subversive advocacy cases. See 
KALVEN, supra note 39, at 179–89; see, e.g., Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 
583, 589–90 (1943) (protecting the right to tell others not to salute the Ameri-
can flag). Kalven describes the Taylor Court’s use of the test as “almost au-
tomatic,” adding that the test had become “commonplace.” KALVEN, supra 
note 39, at 183. 
 48. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 49. Id. at 497–98. 
 50. Id. at 508–11. 
 51. See Chester James Antieau, Dennis v. United States—Precedent, Prin-
ciple or Perversion, 5 VAND. L. REV. 141, 146 (1952) (referring to Dennis as 
“retrogression,” one even worse than the “bad tendency” test because it does 
not require any causal connection “between the expressions of the accused 
and the substantive evil”). The “bad tendency” test itself emerged in the nine-
teenth century and traced back to an English rule banning publications that 
had the tendency to “deprave or corrupt” the reader’s mind. Timothy J. 
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McCarthyism.52 The stench of the era spread to other mid-
century decisions such as Chaplinksky v. New Hampshire53 
that might otherwise have been used to support narrow bans of 
hate speech laws. 
The final period began in the late 1950s when the Supreme 
Court started to throw out convictions in three anti-Communist 
cases,54 and it continued to grow during the 1960s as the civil 
rights movement led the Court in a more libertarian direc-
tion.55 The culmination was Brandenburg v. Ohio when the 
court restricted speech bans to immediate appeals to imminent 
lawless action.56 This ushered in the age of free speech “abso-
lutism” in which restrictions on political speech were looked on 
with suspicion. A high point was the Skokie affair, when the 
Seventh Circuit upheld the right of a small group of American 
Nazis to march in a community with a large proportion of Hol-
ocaust survivors.57 The message—repeated in RAV v. St. 
Paul—was clear: when forced to choose between protecting vic-
tims of hate speech and freedom of speech itself, American 
courts would choose the latter. 58 
                                                                                                                                     
O’Neill, Bad Tendency Test, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
AMERICA 61 (David Schultz & John R. Vile eds., 2005). 
 52. For a discussion of the role of loyalty in American life, see JOHN H. 
SCHAAR, LOYALTY IN AMERICA (1957). For a good account of McCarthyism, see 
DAVID M. OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE: THE WORLD OF JOE 
MCCARTHY (1983). 
 53. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding a dis-
orderly conduct citation on the basis of the fighting words doctrine). 
 54. See KALVEN, supra note 39, at 211–26. Kalven described the change in 
striking terms: “On June 17, 1957 the Cold War came to an end in the Su-
preme Court of the United States.” Id. at 211. The end came after the Court 
ruled against the government in four cases “generated by official anti-
Communism.” Id. The most important of these cases was Yates v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), in which the Court reversed convictions brought 
under the Smith Act against Communist Party leaders in California. KALVEN, 
supra note 39, at 211 (describing Yates). 
 55. WALKER, supra note 35, at 14–16. For an extended discussion of how 
the Civil Rights struggle led to the expansion of press freedoms in the United 
States, see GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION (2007). 
 56. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 57. For a brief discussion of the Skokie affair, see Robert A. Kahn, Cross-
Burning, Holocaust Denial and the Development of Hate Speech Law in the 
United States and Germany, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 163, 169–71 (2006) 
[hereinafter Kahn, Cross-Burning]. 
 58. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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Yet even during the post-Brandenburg period there were ex-
ceptions. During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of states up-
held laws banning masked demonstrations.59 These laws were 
passed decades earlier to target the Ku Klux Klan.60 In addi-
tion, a number of cases made it clear that “true threats”—
including speech targeting the President—could be punished.61 
In 2003, this led to Virginia v. Black, in which the Supreme 
Court allowed bans on cross burning when done with the intent 
to intimidate.62 
From this chronology emerged several maxims of speech pro-
tection. I will highlight four. The first is the marketplace of 
ideas metaphor of Justice Holmes.63 The idea, borrowed from 
John Stuart Mill,64 is that freedom of speech will encourage de-
bates that over time lead to the truth, or at least to the emer-
gence of the soundest ideas for governing society. While the 
metaphor has fallen out of favor with time—especially as peo-
ple have questioned whether the marketplace is equal65—the 
rationale fits nicely with an American focus on equality of op-
portunity (as opposed to equality of results). This is closely re-
lated to the idea of Justice Brandeis that the best response to 
bad speech is more speech.66 
A second theme is the slippery slope—the idea that allowing 
a restriction of one type of speech will lead to multiple re-
strictions on speech. The idea has been expressed in Lee Bol-
linger’s fortress model under which any restriction on extrem-
ist speech (such as a ban on Holocaust denial) is a breach in the 
walls that will lead to more restrictions.67 The fortress model 
                                                                                                                                     
 59. Kahn, Cross-Burning, supra note 57, at 173–75. 
 60. DAVID M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OF THE KU 
KLUX KLAN (1965) (giving a state by state account of anti-Klan policies). 
 61. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (acknowledging the 
power of the state to ban “true threats”). 
 62. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 63. Holmes referred to the marketplace of ideas metaphor in Abrams. 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 64. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
 65. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 
1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984). 
 66. Brandeis made this point in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 356, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 67. See LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 76–103 (1986). 
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fits nicely with the experience of McCarthyism, when freedom 
of speech was almost taken away in the 1940s and 1950s. 
A third, and related, argument often raised by Americans 
against hate speech laws rests on government mistrust.68 One 
fear is that hate speech laws will be turned against the minori-
ty groups they were meant to protect.69 Government is not 
trusted to draw lines between permissible and unacceptable 
restrictions on speech.70 
A fourth trope is the idea of libertarian toughness. Ronald 
Dworkin, opposing restrictions on Holocaust denial laws, spoke 
about the importance of protecting speech even when it really 
hurts.71 Likewise, Justice Brandeis, in his Whitney concur-
rence, criticized those who gave in to fear by burning witches.72 
Writing a half century later, Lee Bollinger argued that the best 
reason for tolerating extremist speech was that it increased so-
ciety’s capacity to withstand future acts of extremist speech—
in other words, toleration helps America develop a thick skin.73 
While this sketch is not definitive, it should be sufficient to 
compare the standard American account of why hate speech 
laws violate freedom of speech with the arguments Rose raised 
in the excerpt from The Tyranny of Silence. As we shall see, 
Rose does not explicitly refer to the canon, and his arguments, 
at times, are substantively quite different. 
                                                                                                                                     
 68. For an example, see Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on 
Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 556 (1990) (describing how 
Great Britain’s 1965 Race Relations Act was used against minority groups). 
 69. Id. This rationale has the interesting side effect of neutralizing the 
race relations problem in the United States. If the government will make race 
relations worse, they must currently not be that bad. 
 70. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 10 (1969) 
(warning that “the apparatus of government required for enforcement of limi-
tations on expression, by its very nature, tends towards administrative ex-
tremes”). 
 71. See Ronald Dworkin, The Unbearable Cost of Liberty, 3 INDEX ON 
CENSORSHIP 43, 46 (1994). 
 72. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 356, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring). However skeptical the American free speech canon is about the state 
power, in his Whitney concurrence, Brandeis expresses a great degree of faith 
in the ability of the ordinary man or woman to grow through courageous acts 
of toleration. 
 73. BOLLINGER, supra note 67, at 237–49. 
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II. ROSE’S THEORY OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Rose’s early forays into free speech theory in the immediate 
aftermath of the Danish cartoon controversy did not rely on 
American examples. For instance, when discussing the Danish 
tradition of satire, he did not mention Hustler v. Falwell74 in 
which the Supreme Court established a broad ranging right to 
satire. Likewise, his discussion about self-censorship—even 
when presented before an American audience—did not lean on 
the American free speech canon. For example, in a 2006 Wash-
ington Post article defending his decision to run the cartoons, 
Rose spoke about the Cold War and invoked Karl Popper’s The 
Open Society and Its Enemies, but he did not mention Holmes, 
Brandeis, New York Times v. Sullivan,75 or Brandenburg.76 
When Rose did invoke the American free speech story, he 
read it in a novel way. In a 2008 Copenhagen Post article at-
tacking the denial of a visa for Dutch politician Geert Wilders, 
Rose turned Holmes’s “fire in a crowded theater” analogy on its 
head: not only was there a right to yell “fire,” but there was al-
so a positive obligation to do so.77 This reading of the Holmes 
metaphor owed something to the particular situation Flem-
ming Rose found himself in. Critics in the United States and 
elsewhere did not question his right to publish the Danish car-
toons; they questioned his wisdom in doing so.78 This required a 
more expansive reading of the Holmes metaphor.79 
Rose, however, did frequently mention the other Cold War 
superpower, the Soviet Union.80 There are biographical reasons 
                                                                                                                                     
 74. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 75. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 76. See Flemming Rose, Op-Ed., Why I Published Those Cartoons, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 19, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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 78. See Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 275–77. 
 79. In addition, Rose’s expansive reading of the Holmes metaphor may 
reflect what Gina Gustavsson calls Rose’s “romantic” liberalism, a term she 
uses to highlight Rose’s preference for action over reflection. Gustavsson, su-
pra note 3, at 12. 
 80. For example, in his Washington Post article defending his decision to 
run the cartoons, Rose refers to the lessons of the Cold War and mentions 
several Soviet dissidents. See Rose, Why I Published Those Cartoons, supra 
note 76. 
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for this.81 Rose grew up a critic of Western imperialism and an 
admirer of the Soviet Union.82 This changed after his 1980–
1981 visit to Moscow, where he met his future wife and the two 
were kept under constant government surveillance—an experi-
ence he claims taught him more about Marxist-Leninism than 
all his prior reading on the subject.83 One can see the influence 
of this experience in his initial response to the Danish cartoon 
controversy. His Washington Post article called “censorship on 
the grounds of insult” a “popular trick of totalitarian move-
ments” and then rattled off a list of Soviet era dissidents.84 He 
warned that “[i]f you give into totalitarian demands once, new 
demands follow.”85 
One could object here that Rose is making a slippery slope 
argument, albeit a samizdat one. But Rose’s samizdat framing 
is noteworthy—he introduced his slippery slope argument as 
the lesson of the Cold War. In addition, one must ask why Rose 
failed to anchor his argument in the American rhetoric—
especially since he was writing in the Washington Post. 
As one turns from Rose’s early writing to The Tyranny of Si-
lence, the terrain becomes more alien from an American per-
spective. In particular, Rose’s theory of free speech departs 
from the American canon in five ways. First, Rose inserts him-
self directly into his theory. Second, he rejects “doubt” as a rea-
son for opposing speech bans. Third, Rose uses Soviet-style 
censorship as a symbol of all he is up against. Fourth, Rose op-
poses what he refers to as “insult taboos.” Finally, Rose makes 
a novel connection between hate speech and the Holocaust. I 
will take up each point in turn. 
A. The Political Is Personal 
The American free speech story relies on distancing between 
speakers and those justifying the right to speak. Simply put, in 
the American concept, there is nothing heroic about speaking. 
For example, in his Abrams dissent, Justice Holmes referred to 
the authors of a pro-Bolshevik pamphlet as “puny anonymi-
                                                                                                                                     
 81. For a brief overview of Rose’s experiences in the Soviet Union, see 
Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 258–59. 
 82. Id. at 258. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Rose, Why I Published Those Cartoons, supra note 76. 
 85. Id. 
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ties.”86 Rather, the people who are brave in the United States 
are those who resist the temptation to respond to speech, ra-
ther than those who, as Justice Brandeis put it in his Whitney 
concurrence, “feared witches and burnt women.”87 Likewise, 
Bollinger’s tolerant society depends on forbearance.88 The lib-
eral citizen is characterized by his or her refusal to respond to 
speech with action.89 
The Tyranny of Silence excerpt is different. Rose is unapolo-
getically central to the story.90 As the publisher of the Danish 
cartoons, he is a global figure—one often heckled and criticized. 
Rose reports how he was called “the Danish devil” by the local 
media in Qatar and how his visit there required the largest se-
curity operation since an earlier visit by Michael Jackson.91 
Admitting that, in his younger days, he was “almost too eager 
to please,”92 Rose reached the conclusion that “as a public fig-
ure” he has “come to symbolize a much greater set of issues 
confronting the world today.”93 Later he compares his role in 
the Danish cartoon controversy to the fall of the Berlin Wall—
historians cannot work out the causation of either event.94 
Whatever Rose is, he does not view himself as a puny anonymi-
ty. 
On one level this makes sense. By running the Danish car-
toons, Rose did play a major role in a global (and European) 
controversy over the limits of freedom of speech.95 As such, it 
may be fitting that Rose plays a major role in his book, espe-
cially if one views it as an apologia for the cartoons. However, 
                                                                                                                                     
 86. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 626 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). 
 87. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 356, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring).  
 88. EMERSON, supra note 70, at 10 (concurring that “maintaining a system 
of freedom of expression” requires “[s]elf-restraint, self-discipline and maturi-
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liberalism. Gustavsson, supra note 3, at 12. 
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the Danish cartoons, at one point complaining that “everywhere I go I pro-
voke controversy.” Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. For an overview of the Danish Cartoon controversy and Flemming 
Rose’s role in it, see Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 258–68. 
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to the extent the book has as its focus Rose’s actions in running 
the cartoons, one may wonder about the reach of American free 
speech theory. Where Holmes, Brandeis, and Bollinger have 
exercise restraint, Rose has acted. 
Rose also made his book personal in a second, more intimate 
way. Rose does not simply figure as the person who ran the 
cartoons, but instead relies heavily on his experiences living in 
the Soviet Union.96 To a lesser extent, he relies on his experi-
ence of being—unfairly in his mind—criticized for running the 
cartoons.97 Both experiences play into two central themes of his 
free speech theory—the rejection of doubt and his use of the 
Soviet Union as an anti-utopia.   
B. The Temptation of Doubt 
Early on in his book, Rose raises the possibility of basing a 
defense of speech on doubt.98 His initial motivation appears to 
be humility (or insecurity). In the immediate aftermath of the 
cartoon controversy, Rose wanted to document “that I was right 
and others were wrong.”99 With time, however, Rose grew less 
sure. Why did he “instinctively enter the fray?”100 Such in-
volvement was not typical for Rose—he “doubt[s] too much for 
that.”101 The cartoon controversy posed a personal mystery: 
Why did a mild-mannered newspaper editor ignite a global con-
troversy? 
There is a narcissistic element to this—here is “the great 
man of history” theory being explored by a “great man” himself. 
But Rose went on to make a broader point about doubt and 
freedom of speech: 
Doubt evokes something unfinished, something uncertain and 
imperfect, yet it is also, as the history of Western civilization 
has shown, a great resource which is founded on the basis of 
strong sense of self, a deeply rooted existential courage that 
leaves room for debate and challenges established truth. Mov-
                                                                                                                                     
 96. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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ing through doubt towards a new truth is a process that is 
sometimes shocking, painful and explosive.102 
Doubt is “essential” for democracies because the latter are 
founded on the idea that “no one has a monopoly on truth.”103 
Moreover, doubt “nurture[s]” democratic institutions, including 
freedom of speech.104 
Rose’s connection between doubt, democracy, and freedom of 
speech is very interesting. He seems to share Post’s concern 
about the importance of free speech for democratic legitima-
cy.105 Not only that, Rose’s emphasis on “existential courage” 
and speech parallels Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in 
Whitney: 
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free 
speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. 
It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of ir-
rational fears. To justify the suppression of free speech there 
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result 
if free speech is practiced.106 
Both Brandeis and Rose see protecting speech as a coura-
geous act—even if their views about the connection between 
doubt and free speech are different (Rose views doubt as a rea-
son to protect speech, while Brandeis sees speech as liberating 
the human subject from “irrational fears”). 
Rose’s paean to doubt is also similar to Laurence Rosen’s 
comment about The Satanic Verses, which Rosen saw as a per-
haps unsuccessful attempt “to consider how doubts about fun-
damentals could exist without fear that such doubts would de-
stroy the faith.”107 Here is an opening that could connect Rose 
to the moderate Muslims he likes to champion in his newspa-
per. 
Finally, Rose’s emphasis on doubt dovetails with a skepticism 
that lurks behind many American rationales for the protection 
of speech. For example, the marketplace of ideas depends in 
                                                                                                                                     
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Post, Racist Speech, supra note 13. 
 106. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 356, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
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part on doubts about the state’s ability to find the truth. The 
same can be said of the argument that hate speech will be used 
against minority groups. In a similar manner, Post relies on 
American state skepticism to explain why hate speech bans ex-
ist in Europe but not in the United States.108 Given all of this, 
do Rose’s comments about doubt suggest that a Euro-American 
convergence is in the offing? 
Maybe not. Rose does not stick with doubt for long. “Of 
course,” adds Rose, there are “limits to doubt.”109 When doubt 
prevents one from distinguishing “between right and wrong,” it 
becomes “a threat to democracy.”110 Nobody could doubt, for ex-
ample, the difference between “the prisoner in the concentra-
tion camp and the regime that imprisoned him.”111 As we shall 
see, Rose connects his rejection of doubt to the Soviet Union, 
the prime example of a totalitarian regime for Rose.112 
But is this the only reason Rose rejects doubt? I am not so 
sure. There are many ways to think about Soviet-style censor-
ship and freedom of speech that do not remove doubt. For ex-
ample, why shouldn’t the Soviet enforcement of Marxist-
Leninist truths leave Rose with an enhanced appreciation of 
doubt? Likewise, I am not sure why the other parts of his theo-
ry of free speech require a rejection of doubt. 
For Rose, the danger of doubt may be personal. Rose wrote 
the Tyranny of Silence after standing at the center of an inter-
national controversy during which he suffered through what he 
saw as unjust criticism of his decision to run the cartoons.113 
Rose likened this critique to an “assault.”114 Perhaps his per-
sonal experiences explain his conclusion that there must be 
limits to doubt—both for societies and individuals.115 
                                                                                                                                     
 108. Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREMIST SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 122, 
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C. Rose’s Samizdat Speech Theory 
As noted above, Rose makes much of his experience in the 
Soviet Union. He describes it as a place where freedom was not 
a given and everyone looked over his or her shoulders.116 These 
experiences helped Rose understand that “words meant some-
thing”—not to the government but to the speaker.117 Indeed 
words could even be “dangerous.”118 In such a “fearful climate,” 
official censorship was “almost unnecessary”—instead, “the 
tyranny of silence was king.”119 Notice the shift in Rose’s 
thought. In the traditional American free speech paradigm, the 
focus is on the harm posed by the speaker. Is the United States 
a tolerant enough society to allow a neo-Nazi or Klan member 
to utter racist comments? The answer is usually “yes.” Indeed, 
for Lee Bollinger, the decision to tolerate a hate speaker in a 
specific instance serves as proof of the society’s tolerant na-
ture.120 
Rose takes a different perspective. Instead of concentrating 
on the harm posed by speech, he focuses on the speaker. In a 
society like the Soviet Union, fear became so enshrined that 
words become “dangerous” and people become afraid to 
speak.121 Rose uses his Soviet experience in two ways. First, he 
uses it to create a general explanation of why freedom of speech 
is essential.122 Second, he uses Cold War-era arguments 
against Soviet sympathizers in the West to buttress his core 
theory of speech protection.123 We will take up each point in 
turn. 
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Soviet-style censorship, however deplorable, does not imme-
diately suggest a reason for protecting speech. The Soviet Un-
ion is long gone. Even the most robust European welfare state 
falls short of Soviet-style repression. This poses a potential 
challenge to Rose’s use of his Soviet experience. 
Not surprisingly, Rose responds to this challenge on a per-
sonal level. Just as Soviet citizens feared to speak, so has he.124 
Describing his post-cartoon controversy experiences to Salman 
Rushdie, Rose explained how “unpleasant” it was “to hear your 
own story told without ability to comment.”125 He realized the 
solution when he heard Rushdie say on television that “man” is 
“a story-telling animal” and “the ability to tell one’s own story 
is an existential right.”126 Rose, following Rushdie, explained 
how: 
[A]ny attempt to limit the story-telling impulse is not merely 
censorship, or infringement upon a political right to freedom 
of speech; it is an act of violence against human nature, an ex-
istential assault that transforms man into something he is 
not.127 
On one level, this is similar to arguments that defend speech 
based on personal autonomy.128 But Rose goes a step further. 
Not only does he view “any” speech restriction as “an act of vio-
lence against human nature,” but he also has a concrete Soviet-
inspired example of what this looks like. 
Here, Rose’s Cold War arguments come into play. Rose de-
scribes the “closed society,” in Soviet terms, as a place where 
the government dictates history and those who challenge the 
official account of history face “censorship, imprisonment, or 
elimination.”129 In defending his position, Rose warns against 
those who argue that toleration of speech is a “cultural” is-
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 125. Rose added that the experience “felt like an assault.” Id. One wonders 
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sue.130 While conceding that some cultures are more individual-
istic while others are more collective, Rose warns against fol-
lowing the example of the “self-knowledge” school, “which ad-
vocated that scholars describe and analyze the oppressive re-
gime on its own terms.”131 These scholars, in the name of cul-
tural relativism, marginalized the Soviet civil rights move-
ments and presented the dissidents as pawns of the Western 
powers.132 
This leaves Rose with a contrast. In free societies, people can 
“tell and retell our own and other people’s stories”—all topics 
are open for public debate.133 The resulting “exchange of ideas” 
can move history forward.134 As examples, he discusses how 
“challenges to the conventional wisdom” hastened the demise of 
American slavery, National Socialism in Germany, and Com-
munism in the Eastern Bloc.135 By contrast, once one begins 
“limiting and controlling certain expressions” one is “only dis-
cussing what level of un-freedom” is acceptable.136 Put more 
bluntly, societies that censor speech are taking steps toward 
Soviet totalitarianism. 
To buttress his argument, Rose draws a connection between 
Islam and Soviet Communism. For example, he sees “parallels” 
between Soviet dissidents and dissenters against Islam.137 Like 
the earlier dissidents, opponents of Islam play a critical role in 
making sure that the West lives up to its values.138 On a per-
sonal level, the Islam-Soviet connection helps Rose justify his 
own actions while assuring his place in history. He published 
the Danish cartoons as a response to self-censorship, just like 
the dissidents who helped bring down the Berlin Wall.139 
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D. Rose’s Call to Abolish “Insult Taboos” 
As we have seen, Rose draws heavily on his experiences in 
the Soviet Union to establish that silencing is dangerous, given 
the human need to speak. When faced with what he sees as the 
new Soviets—radical Islam, the Organization of Islamic Coun-
tries (“OIC”) and its defenders—Rose is on fairly comfortable 
ground. He can refer to the Soviet past and explain the im-
portance of speaking out, and he has a ready-made argument 
against censorship. But Rose’s argument is limited in scope. It 
would ban blasphemy laws, especially with draconian penalties 
one often finds in a majority of Muslim countries, but it would 
appear less effective as an argument against the garden variety 
hate speech laws one finds in Europe.140 
But Rose’s support of free speech does not stop at preventing 
radical Islamists from cowing dissenters into silence. He takes 
the position that “any” restriction on speech leaves speakers 
(and the larger society) un-free.141 In its near-absolutism, this 
argument has an American feel to it. But Rose does not rely on 
the harmlessness of the speech, or the positive role speech 
played in the American movement for civil rights.142 Instead, 
Rose centers his argument on multiculturalism and political 
correctness.143 
Rose begins with a choice faced by modern societies in which 
people of different cultures live and work together in close 
proximity.144 A society committed to equality could make an 
agreement to ban all offensive speech. The logic of this ar-
rangement is clearly stated: “If you respect my taboos, I’ll re-
spect yours.”145 This solution, however, risks spiraling out of 
control. Once one starts banning Holocaust denial, crimes 
against Communism, or disrespectful cartoons about the 
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prophet, where does one end?146 There is only one way to avoid 
the chaos from mutual insult taboos—namely, an understand-
ing that “in a democracy no one can claim the right to be not 
offended.”147 
This has some overlap with the American accounts of speech. 
Rose’s concern about where to stop after banning Holocaust 
denial, crimes against Communism, and offensive cartoons is a 
classic slippery slope argument.148 His point about no one hav-
ing the right not to be offended is very close to Volokh’s own 
response to the Danish cartoons—the fact that “I’m offended” is 
not a good enough reason to ban a speech act.149 
On the other hand, Rose places great emphasis on jokes. He 
begins with the idea that no group in a democracy has the “ex-
clusive” right to tell stories about itself.150 In fact, he imagines 
something close to a free-for-all. In a democracy: 
Muslims have the right to tell jokes and critical stories about 
Jews; non-believers can skewer Islam anyway they like. 
Danes may mock Swedes and Norwegians, whites can joke 
about blacks, and blacks can joke about whites.151 
To do otherwise is “simple-minded” and “harmful.”152 He then 
asks whether practices like female circumcision and forced 
marriage should be above criticism because they are only prac-
ticed by a minority.153 
This line of argument is noteworthy in several respects. First, 
it goes beyond the slippery slope argument in the way it as-
signs a positive value to joking. Criticism plays an important 
role for Rose. In addition to helping to curb objectionable social 
practices, it avoids “ghettoization” and makes it easier to com-
municate with others.154 As Rose puts it, in an open society it is 
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much harder to maintain that an idea is “evil, perverse, or in-
sane, unless that’s truly the case.”155 The closest American par-
allel is Lee Bollinger’s point that tolerating offensive speech 
creates an ability in society to tolerate more speech.156 But Rose 
goes even further—he sees insults as improving the quality of 
the discussion by fostering a climate of inclusiveness.157 
In this regard, Rose’s defense of joking may owe something to 
the Danish tradition of satire he mentioned in his earliest de-
fenses of the cartoons.158 He argued—unconvincingly to many—
that the cartoons would have the impact of integrating Mus-
lims by including them in a national culture of joking.159 As I 
pointed out in another article a few years ago, there is some 
evidence that informal joking and teasing do indeed play a role 
in Danish culture.160 
If this reading of Rose is correct, it says something about how 
theories of free speech get created. By hook or crook, he has be-
come connected with a major twenty-first century freedom of 
                                                                                                                                     
 155. Id. 
 156. See BOLLINGER, supra note 67, at 237–49. The focus on the positive 
value of public criticism and debate for a democratic society also bears some 
similarity to Justice Brennan’s argument in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (“[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide open.”). 
 157. To continue the comparison with Justice Brennan’s opinion in Sulli-
van, Brennan sees the public value in a “robust” debate, but Brennan limited 
himself to public officials, hardly a minority group. Brennan also seems to 
lack Rose’s faith in the power of public teasing to foster an atmosphere of 
inclusiveness. In this regard, Brennan’s opinion calls for a Dworkinian trade-
off: public officials enduring offensive speech so that society as a whole will 
have a more open debate on public issues. See Dworkin, supra note 71, at 46. 
 158. For example, Rose raised the satire point during a CNN interview at 
the start of the controversy. Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 263. 
 159. For the failure of these arguments to win over American supporters, 
see id. at 268–78. 
 160. See Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 279–82. My article traces 
back Rose’s inclusiveness argument to two Danish norms. The first is hygge—
the idea of social informality and social teasing, something that has been de-
scribed as an adaptation to the lonely Scandinavian nights. Id. at 280–81 
(discussing STEVEN M BORISH: THE LAND OF THE LIVING: THE DANISH FOLK 
HIGH SCHOOLS AND DENMARK’S NON-VIOLENT PATH TO MODERNIZATION (1991)). 
The second idea, egalitarian uniformity (folkelighed), expresses the goal of 
teasing: to keep the “talented” in their place by pressing the message that 
nobody is better than anyone else. Id. at 282–83. Taken together, these ideas 
raise a specifically local, albeit partial explanation for why the cartoons con-
troversy took place in Denmark. 
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speech controversy. In defending himself, Rose has relied on a 
specifically Danish way of viewing jokes and insults.161 As such, 
the Danish concept of social teasing will gain from Rose’s fame 
(or notoriety). This complicates efforts to view the debate over 
hate speech policy as moving in a single direction toward a 
common, global set of policies. 
E. Speech Restrictions and the Nazi Rise to Power 
Opponents of hate speech laws often discuss the Nazi past.162 
There are good reasons for this. In the aftermath of the Holo-
caust, restrictions on hate speech laws have been premised, in 
part, on a revulsion against Hitler’s crimes.163 The argument 
can be stated broadly—“Words can lead to deeds”—which fo-
cuses the concern on Nazi speech in general. Or one can make a 
narrower argument—the lax enforcement of speech restrictions 
during the Weimar Republic facilitated the Nazi rise to power. 
The latter argument was relied on by Karl Loewenstein, who 
used it to justify his militant democracy theory.164 
American proponents of speech protection have also taken up 
the Nazi past. They have tried a variety of responses. For ex-
ample, Ronald Dworkin, opposing Holocaust denial laws, simp-
ly balanced the Nazi harm against freedom of speech—the lat-
ter calls for sacrifices, even those that “really hurt.”165 Another 
set of arguments focus on the passage of time. Criticizing Holo-
caust denial laws, Peter Teachout asks whether such laws are 
necessary sixty years after Nuremburg.166 Finally, some writ-
ers, like Aryeh Neier, noting the presence of hate speech bans 
during the Weimar Republic, took up the causal question di-
rectly—given these bans, how can the rise of the Nazis be 
blamed on freedom of speech?167 
                                                                                                                                     
 161. Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 280–82. 
 162. For examples of free speech advocates who take this step, see 
Teachout, supra note 17, at 689–92; Dworkin, supra note 71, at 46. 
 163. For an overview, see Cyril Levitt, Under the Shadow of Weimar: What 
Are the Lessons for the Modern Democracies, in UNDER THE SHADOW OF 
WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND RACIAL INCITEMENTS IN SIX COUNTRIES 15 
(Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt eds., 1993). 
 164. See Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I, 
31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417 (1937). 
 165. Dworkin, supra note 71, at 46. 
 166. See Teachout, supra note 17, at 689–92. 
 167. ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE 
CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM 160–68 (1979). 
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As someone who called in Israel for the open publication of 
Mein Kampf,168 Rose had to respond to these arguments. And 
respond he did—but in a quite novel way. When explaining 
how it was wrong to let only members of a given minority group 
tell jokes about themselves, he used the Nazis as an example of 
a “persecuted and marginalized minority.”169 To be sure, Rose 
is no Holocaust denier. His “Words and Deeds” piece is devoted 
to exploring the relationship between hate speech and the Nazi 
crimes against the Jews.170 But the reference to Nazis as “a 
persecuted and marginalized minority” is bizarre. 
To put this in American terms, does anyone refer to the Ku 
Klux Klan as a “persecuted minority?” Or consider the Skokie 
affair. It led to a wave of resignations from the ACLU.171 All of 
this occurred even though Frank Collin, the leader of the Nazi 
band who wanted to march in Skokie, was dismissed by many 
at the time as an attention seeker, a puny anonymity rather 
than a Nazi threat.172 Despite this, the Seventh Circuit, up-
holding Collin’s right to protest, did not refer to the Nazis as a 
“persecuted . . . minority.”173 Instead, it expressed regret that, 
despite “several thousand years of attempting to strengthen 
the often thin coating of civilization,” there would be those 
“who would resort to hatred and vilification.”174 
Rose also has some unusual things to say about the Nazi rise 
to power. In his “Words and Deeds” article, Rose makes a num-
ber of telling arguments against the position that freedom of 
speech facilitated the Nazis.175 For example, he argued that 
even though those who “defended the offended could adorn 
themselves with halos of justice,” prosecutions actually gave 
Nazis such as Der Stürmer editor Julius Streicher “a glorious 
opportunity to bait the Jewish community in the German 
courtrooms and in a national press, which otherwise would 
                                                                                                                                     
 168. See Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 265. 
 169. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3. 
 170. Rose, Words and Deeds, supra note 25. 
 171. For a discussion of the conflict within the ACLU, see DAVID HAMLIN, 
THE NAZI/SKOKIE CONFLICT: A CIVIL LIBERTIES BATTLE (1980) (Hamlin was the 
executive director of the Illinois American Civil Liberties Union chapter dur-
ing the Skokie affair). 
 172. See Kahn, Cross-Burning, supra note 57, at 169–71. 
 173. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3; Collin v. Smith, 
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 174. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1210. 
 175. Rose, Words and Deeds, supra note 25. 
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have spared them precious little ink.”176 He also noted how 
Weimar courts issued narrow interpretations of the law against 
religious incitement—for example, by treating anti-Semitic 
propaganda as targeting Jews as a “race” and therefore falling 
outside the scope of the law.177 To buttress his points, Rose re-
ferred to American and Canadian participants in this debate, 
such as historian William Showalter and Alan Borovoy, then 
leader of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.178 
But Rose reached an unusually broad conclusion. Instead of 
simply rejecting the premise that Nazi hate speech paved the 
way for the Holocaust, Rose turned it on its head: “In fact, one 
might forcibly argue that what paved the way for the Holocaust 
was the ban on hate speech.”179 This statement is ambiguous. 
Read the wrong way, it can be seen as transferring some of the 
blame for the Holocaust from the Nazis to supporters of Wei-
mar-era hate speech bans, a group that doubtless included 
some Jews. 
Other parts of the article reflect Rose’s Soviet experience. For 
example, he started a section of the article, titled “Nazi Ger-
many and free speech,” by discussing how in the Soviet Union, 
“the machinery of propaganda vanished away nationalism.”180 
He went on to describe Hitler’s Germany as a “tyranny of si-
lence,” under which “no freedom existed to counter the witch-
hunt against the Jewish community.”181 However reasonable 
this description is of speech restrictions in Hitler’s Germany, 
which grew draconian as the Second World War progressed,182 
the phrasing is odd. Was censorship—even Hitler’s—an im-
portant causal factor behind the Holocaust? One gets the sense 
that Rose is stretching his samizdat free speech theory beyond 
its comfort zone.183 
                                                                                                                                     
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 180. Id. (emphasis added). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See INGO MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 
140–52 (1991) (describing how the People’s Court would extract harsh pun-
ishments—including the death penalty—for the expression of defeatist sen-
timents). 
 183. To raise another point about Rose’s treatment of the Nazi past, in his 
book Rose explains how “a particular interpretation of the prelude to the Sec-
ond World War in Europe” is “affecting [hate speech] legislation all over the 
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Overall, Rose’s foray into the Nazi past was a strange one. He 
made a larger argument than he needed to carry his point (i.e., 
hate speech bans, rather than being ineffective, helped cause 
the Nazi seizure of power) and sought to remake the Nazi past 
in the image of Soviet repression.184 
F. Where Does America Fit In? 
To summarize, Rose’s theory of freedom of speech departs 
from the classic American free speech story in several respects. 
His account is unduly personal, and after some temptation, 
Rose rejects the skepticism so characteristic of the American 
free speech canon.185 Instead, Rose relies on his experiences in 
the Soviet Union to create an account that emphasizes the 
harm censorship poses to the speaker, rather than the harm 
the tolerated speech poses to society.186 According to Rose, any 
restrictions on speech leave the speaker—and society—less 
free.187 Rose combines this with a confidence in the power of 
jokes, insults, and good-natured teasing to advance social 
change, something he may draw from Danish political cul-
ture.188 Finally, faced with the Nazi example—a hurdle present 
for Europeans who oppose hate speech laws—he falls back on 
his anti-Soviet theory of speech protection.189 The period to be 
concerned with is not the Nazi rise to power, it is the “tyranny 
of silence” that ensued after 1933.190 
America figures very little into all of this. For someone who 
was a staple on CNN at the height of the cartoon controver-
sy,191 this is odd. One can speculate on reasons for this. Was 
Rose disappointed in the failure of most American papers to 
run the Danish cartoons? Or was his theory of free speech 
                                                                                                                                     
globe.” Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3 (emphasis add-
ed). Rose’s choice of language hearkens back to the Nuremburg trials when 
the evil of the Holocaust was not viewed separately from Germany’s respon-
sibility for starting the Second World War. 
 184. In The Tyranny of Silence, Rose deals with the Weimar example in a 
more measured way. According to Rose, the Republic failed to enforce the 
laws it had. Moreover, “evil deeds, not evil words” toppled the Republic. Id. 
 185. See supra Parts II.A, II.B. 
 186. See supra Part II.C. 
 187. See supra Part II.D. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See supra Part II.E. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 263–64. 
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largely in place before he came to “symbolize a much greater 
set of issues?”192 Or does this say something about how free 
speech theories—like political theories more generally—are in-
herently grounded in the identity of the nation, ethnic group, or 
society that holds them? To put it another way, is the real prob-
lem one of expecting—from an American perspective—that 
Rose would mention Oliver Wendell Holmes, the marketplace 
of ideas, or Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney v. 
California?193 
But before drawing larger conclusions, let us focus on what 
Rose does draw from the United States. Some of Rose’s argu-
ments could have been presented in classic American terms. 
For example, his discussion of insult taboos could be worked 
into a slippery slope argument (or something akin to Lee Bol-
linger’s fortress model).194 Rose also comes close to the market-
place of ideas theme, especially when describing how fulsome 
discussions brought down Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and 
American slavery.195 There would have been more comparisons, 
perhaps, had Rose gone with his passing comments about the 
role of doubt in justifying freedom of speech. 
However, the excerpt from The Tyranny of Silence contains 
only one explicit reference to the free speech canon. Early on in 
the excerpt Rose commends the American “tradition of uphold-
ing absolute freedom of expression” to his European readers: 
Faced with growing diversity, Europe has recently tended to 
increase restrictions on the freedom of expression; the majori-
ty of the laws criminalizing the denial of the Holocaust have 
been passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The United 
States, with its tradition of upholding absolute freedom of ex-
pression, stands more and more alone on this issue. In my 
                                                                                                                                     
 192. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3. 
 193. Maybe Rose is uncomfortable with American canons, the rejection of 
McCarthyism, and the Cold War framing that goes with it. Consider Harry 
Kalven Jr.’s observations that, for the Supreme Court, the Cold War ended in 
1957. KALVEN, supra note 39, at 211. How appealing can this be for Flem-
ming Rose who, in his own way, is still fighting the Cold War today? 
 194. For more on Rose’s use of slippery slope arguments, see Rose, The Tyr-
anny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3; see also BOLLINGER, supra note 67, at 
76–103. 
 195. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3. 
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opinion, Europe should learn more from our friends on the 
other side of the Atlantic.196 
On one level, the message here is fairly straightforward—
Europe should become more like the United States and adopt 
“absolute freedom of expression.” One wonders, however, why 
in the excerpt of The Tyranny of Silence, there is little else on 
offer.197 
By mentioning Europe’s growing diversity, Rose draws a con-
trast with an already diverse America.198 In an earlier Spiegel 
article, Rose struck a similar tone. In the article, he described a 
visit to Brighton Beach where he encountered a “burgeoning, 
bustling, and altogether vibrant Russian immigrant communi-
ty” and marveled at “America’s ability to absorb newcomers”—
something Europe apparently lacked.199 
Rose is also a fan of American rock music. To be sure, in his 
Spiegel article he called John Lennon’s Imagine “beautiful but 
stupid”200—a reflection perhaps of his experiences in the Soviet 
Union. But he started a heading of The Tyranny of Silence ex-
cerpt, titled “Satire and Mass Murder,” with quotations from 
Bob Dylan and Bruce Springsteen songs.201 
Despite this, Rose has kept his distance from American legal 
culture. Perhaps the marketplace of ideas is less pithy than 
Bruce Springsteen. Perhaps it reflects unease with the classic 
American world view of freedom of speech. Or perhaps, unlike 
the dominant global position of American rock and roll music, 
in the worldwide discussion over freedom of speech Holmes, 
                                                                                                                                     
 196. Id. 
 197. Let me reiterate that my comments are based on the English-language 
excerpt on Rose’s website. There may well be more discussion of the United 
States in the yet to be translated part of his 528 page book. 
 198. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3. 
 199. Rose, Why I Published the Muhammad Cartoons, supra note 13. Inter-
estingly, Rose mentions American slavery as one of the three systems of evil 
brought down by the power of free speech. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Ex-
cerpt), supra note 3. 
 200. Rose, Why I Published the Muhammad Cartoons, supra note 13. 
 201. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3. The Bob Dylan 
lyrics Rose used were: “Never been’ able to separate the good from the bad/ 
Ooh, I can’t stand it, I can’ stand it /It’s making me feel so sad.” From Bruce 
Springsteen, Rose quoted: “I woke up this morning to an empty sky.” Id. 
Likewise, Rose’s website promoting his book sports a quote from Simon & 
Garfunkel: “Fools, said I, you do not know, silence like a cancer grows.” Id. 
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Brandeis, and the rest of the American free speech canon are 
not the only game in town. 
III. ROSE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Rose’s failure to rely on the American free speech canon in 
The Tyranny of Silence also has implications for how compara-
tive law scholars look at the global discourse over areas of legal 
doctrine such as freedom of speech. One of the leading theories, 
neo-functionalism, takes the position that “the relevant unit of 
analysis is not a geographic entity, such as a country or region  
. . . but rather the problem and its legal solution.”202 The goal of 
comparative analysis is to solve a doctrinal question—such as 
when to ban hate speech.203 For neo-functionalists, there is no 
other reason to turn to foreign law. In the words of comparative 
scholar Rudolph Jhering: “The reception of foreign legal insti-
tutions is not a matter of nationality, but of usefulness and 
need.”204 
One could avoid the theoretical issue by simply concluding 
that the American canon was not “useful” for Rose. As Jhering 
puts it, “No one bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has 
one as good or better at home.”205 This possibility, that the 
American speech canon is not “useful,” can help counter the 
tendency of Americans to view the First Amendment as the 
panacea to all the world’s problems.206 
But what if the American canon in fact does contain at least 
something useful to Rose? Neo-functionalism starts from the 
premise that people are rational actors who seek the “best” so-
lution to their legal problems—be it abolishing the death pen-
                                                                                                                                     
 202. Teitel, supra note 21, at 2574. 
 203. Over time, comparative analysis will lead to a “significant degree of 
congruence between problems and their possible solutions.” Id. at 2576 (quot-
ing NORMAN DORSEN, MICHEL ROSENFELD, ANDRÁS SAJÓ & SUSANNE BAER, 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASE AND MATERIALS 8 (2003)). 
 204. Id. at 2575 (quoting Rudolph Jhering) (internal citations omitted). 
 205. Id. 
 206. This tendency was especially strong after the fall of the Berlin wall. 
For example, A.E. Dick Howard, reading through the constitutions of the 
“fledgling democracies” of “Central and Eastern Europe,” argued that “the 
United States Constitution and Bill of Rights are widely recognized as fur-
nishing paradigms of the fundamental principles that define constitutional 
democracy.” A.E. Dick Howard, How Ideas Travel: Rights at Home and 
Abroad, in CONSTITUTION MAKING IN EASTERN EUROPE 14–15 (A.E. Dick How-
ard ed., 1993). 
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alty for juveniles, extending gay rights, or protecting freedom 
of speech.207 The good lawyers join hands across the world—or 
at least across the democratic world208—to solve common prob-
lems. Rose’s memoir complicates this picture. He ignored a po-
tentially useful interpretive frame of reference. 
While neo-functionalists insist on leaving out “nationality,” is 
it possible that considerations of national identity helped to ex-
plain Rose’s rejection of a “foreign” model of speech interpreta-
tion? One can see echoes of national identity in the debate over 
the global protection of hate speech dominated by an unwill-
ingness of Americans to adopt European theories of hate 
speech regulation and vice versa.209 
For example, Hungarian scholar András Koltay called Lee 
Bollinger’s argument that allowing hate speech makes a society 
more tolerant a “brave and genuine American theory.”210 Koltay 
added that such a theory may flourish “in the homeland of two 
hundred years of uninterrupted constitutional development” 
but that “the European eye looks at it as a curiosity.”211 One 
sees something similar in Canadian complaints about Ameri-
can First Amendment “romanticism.”212 These two incidents 
can be viewed as resistance to an Americanization of free 
                                                                                                                                     
 207. See Teitel, supra note 21, at 2577–78. Here Teitel is justly critical, ac-
cusing the neo-functionalists of assuming “[a] shared understanding of the 
aims of constitutionalism that has not yet emerged.” Id. at 2576. 
 208. Id. at 2592. 
 209. This dynamic works in two ways. First, the stories and narratives that 
accompany legal doctrines like the American free speech canon are a source 
of shared identity, creating an imagined community in which Americans 
across the country know what free speech is. In this regard, the First 
Amendment canon is an expression of national identity, no different from a 
monument, museum, or public park. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED 
COMMUNITIES 163–80 (rev. ed. 1991) (describing how maps, census data, and 
museum icons hold a much broader “imagined community” together). Second, 
members of a given community will reject what they perceive as alien legal 
doctrines as a way of distinguishing themselves from other groups. See Fred-
rik Barth, Introduction, in ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES 9, 15–16 (Fredrik 
Barth ed., 1969). 
 210. ANDRÁS KOLTAY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE UNREACHABLE MIRAGE 13 
(2013) (discussing BOLLINGER, supra note 67) (emphasis added). 
 211. Id. 
 212. See Robert A. Kahn, Hate Speech and National Identity: The Case of 
the United States and Canada 16–17 (Univ. of St. Thomas Legal Studies Re-
search Paper No. 08-02, 2008) (citing Alan Borovoy et al., Language as Vio-
lence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives on 
Group Defamation, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 337, 353–54 (1987)). 
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speech discourse, and Rose’s arguments can be viewed as a 
third. 
This leads to a second point. Rose did not simply ignore the 
American speech canon. He also relied on his experience in the 
Soviet Union and his conversations with Salman Rushdie.213 
These are not Danish sources, but they are not American ei-
ther. This raises a second problem with comparative constitu-
tional theory. In critiquing the neo-functionalists, Teitel calls 
for a “dialogic” approach to the study of comparative constitu-
tional discourse.214 The new approach involves moving from 
“diffusion and reception” of legal ideas to “dialogue” that “is not 
bound in path-dependent or hierarchic ways.”215 
On one level this is encouraging. Teitel rightly charges neo-
functionalism with “abstract[ing] problems from their particu-
lar contexts to arrive at a constitutionalism hardly identifiable 
with politics or place.”216 But for Teitel the dialogic approach is 
still “normative”—her goal is “global solidarity,” which will cre-
ate “cosmopolitan effects” that may “transcend” individual 
states.217 In the area of human rights, the dialogue will render 
a “universal law of humanity,” what she calls “the culmination 
of comparativism.”218 
If Rose were interested in “global solidarity,” he could have 
built a theory of free speech that rested at least partly on the 
American free speech canon. But he did not. Indeed, his em-
phasis is on the story-teller who is propelled by human nature 
to fight self-censorship.219 This is quite different from the 
American free speech ethos, which views tolerating offensive 
speech as an act of restraint and suggests that there is more 
than one way of defending freedom of speech.220 The gap be-
tween Rose’s theory and the American norm highlights the 
competitive nature of speech claims—one already evident in 
                                                                                                                                     
 213. ROSE, THE TYRANNY OF SILENCE, supra note 3. 
 214. Teitel, supra note 21, at 2584–87. 
 215. Id. at 2586. 
 216. Id. at 2577. 
 217. Id. at 2586–87. 
 218. Id. at 2593. 
 219. ROSE, THE TYRANNY OF SILENCE, supra note 3. 
 220. BOLLINGER, supra note 67, at 243. 
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the heated debates about the competing rationales for protect-
ing speech.221 
Of course, Rose is not merely a free speech theorist; he is also 
a participant in a global dispute. When one combines this with 
the global outrage that accompanied the publication of the 
Danish cartoons, one would be tempted to dismiss Rose.222 But 
this does not do justice to the scope of issues Rose covers in his 
book and the depth of his thought. Nor is Rose alone. The con-
ception of human nature that underlies his theory draws heavi-
ly from Salman Rushdie.223 Rather than wishing Rose’s theory 
away, the more intellectually honest course is to accept that 
there are multiple theories of speech protection, all of which 
are competing with each other in an increasingly well-
connected world.224 
                                                                                                                                     
 221. See generally KOLTAY, supra note 210, at 3–18 (describing rationales 
for protecting speech based on truth-seeking, democratic legitimacy, and per-
sonal autonomy). 
 222. Jytte Klausen, writing as the controversy reached its peak, was dis-
missive of Rose, describing the cartoons as a “gag, the kind you do when the 
news was slow.” See Jytte Klausen, Cartoon Jihad—Rotten Judgment in the 
State of Denmark, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb. 8, 2006), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/cartoon-jihad-rotten-judgment-in-the-
state-of-denmark-a-399653.html. Others saw the cartoons as part of a broad-
er anti-Muslim sentiment brewing in Denmark. See Robert A. Kahn, The 
Danish Cartoon Controversy and the Exclusivist Turn in European Civic Na-
tionalism, 8 STUD. ETHNICITY & NATIONALISM 524, 528–30 (2008) (describing 
the political climate in which the Danish cartoons ran). 
 223. In a 2012 speech in Delhi, Rushdie defended speech in language very 
similar to Rose. See Alison Flood, Salman Rushdie Defends Freedom of 
Speech in a Rousing Address in Delhi, GUARDIAN, Mar. 27, 2012 (describing 
the “human being” as a “language animal” and describing censorship of any 
kind as an “existential crime”). 
 224. Indeed, the Rose-Rushdie position on speech, with its emphasis on the 
human need to tell stories, could challenge the standard accounts of speech 
based on truth, democratic deliberation, and personal autonomy, especially 
given the Rose-Rushdie emphasis on the role of the artist in society. Another 
feature is how—in both the Danish cartoon and Satanic Verses controver-
sies—the expressive act becomes an iconic text whose public display is itself a 
symbol of freedom of speech. Thus, when Kurt Westergaard, the author of the 
turban cartoon, was attacked, one response was to re-run the Danish car-
toons. Newspapers Reprint Prophet Mohammed Cartoon, CNN (Feb. 13, 
2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/02/13/denmark.cartoon. 
Likewise, after a Rushdie event was cancelled in Delhi, his supporters en-
gaged in a public reading of The Satanic Verses. See Flood, supra note 223. 
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Likewise, Teitel misses this element of conflict and uncer-
tainty when she writes that “comparativism offers the potential 
for global solidarity” and that comparative constitutionalism 
can “interrogate[] foreign mores as a step in the pursuit of uni-
versal morality.”225 Are “global solidarity” and “universal mo-
rality” always worthy goals? What if, for example, the “univer-
sal morality” imposes a ceiling on rights rather than a floor? 
Consider, for example, the question of banning Holocaust deni-
al. In 2008, the European Union adopted a framework decision 
requiring that member states ban Holocaust denial, thereby 
expanding a ban that may make sense in France, Germany, 
and Austria to other countries where Holocaust denial is less of 
a problem.226 The Europe-wide directive is a move toward a 
universal norm, but this does not necessarily mean it is a good 
decision.227 
The global discourse over free speech is best seen as a rough 
and tumble argument. There may well be areas—such as the 
death penalty for juveniles—where there is evidence of conver-
gence.228 And it is certainly legitimate to argue, as a normative 
matter, that the global debate over free speech should converge 
around a given set of norms, something Geert Wilders asserts 
when he calls for “[a] First Amendment for Europe”229—
although this formulation still leaves Asia, Africa, and Latin 
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America out of the picture.230 But little insight is gained by pre-
tending that the conversation as a whole is converging on a 
shared set of goals if this is not the case.231 While all compara-
tive study involves making simplifying choices, Teitel’s empha-
sis on “solidarity” and “cooperation” leaves too much out of an 
unwieldy, raucous conversation—at least in the area of hate 
speech regulation. Despite her stated desire to move away from 
the static neo-functional method, her dialogic approach 
amounts to neo-functionalism in new clothing. 
CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF CONVERGENCE 
Born in Denmark, enamored of the Soviet Union—until he 
tried to live there—and then the subject of global outrage after 
he published twelve cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, 
Flemming Rose was shaped by his experiences. The same ap-
plies for the theory of freedom of speech he developed in The 
Tyranny of Silence. He compared himself to Soviet dissidents, 
not Holmes and Brandeis; he borrowed Salman Rushdie’s view 
of “man” as a story-telling animal against whom any speech 
restriction was an “existential insult,” implicitly rejecting Jus-
tice Holmes’s view of the speaker as a “puny anonymity.” And 
when he sought to explain the benefit of toleration for society 
as a whole, he fell back on the Danish tradition of satire, not 
Lee Bollinger’s genuinely “American” argument that toleration 
is good for the social fabric of the country. 
This leads to two larger conclusions. First, global theories of 
comparative constitutional interpretation—while extremely 
helpful to conceptualize issues—can only go so far in explaining 
why people living in a given society support or oppose hate 
speech bans. Personal experience and local culture also play a 
role. So, in this regard, the functionalists are wrong to disre-
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gard nationality (and more generally place) in accounting for 
which legal doctrines triumph in a given legal system. To put it 
another way, lawyers are people too—they will select ideas not 
simply because they are useful, but because they like them. 
What they like will be influenced by culture. 
The turn to national identity theory would return compara-
tive law to its late nineteenth-century origin, a time of radical 
nationalism.232 This early comparative theory was faulted as 
“static,” “descriptive,” and “Eurocentric.”233 But there is a dif-
ference. The late nineteenth-century comparative lawyers saw 
“national laws as autonomous, static, incontrovertible enti-
ties”—a reflection of nation-states seen in the same way.234 By 
contrast, the modern identity theory is much more fluid. An-
derson, instead of taking nations as given, views them as cre-
ated by discursive practices.235 Likewise, Barth rejected the 
static, formalistic concept of identity, with a recognition that 
identity depends on boundaries and can change as the bounda-
ries change.236 What is more, even from a neo-functionalist per-
spective, taking considerations of national identity into account 
will enrich doctrinal analysis by suggesting reasons why a giv-
en doctrinal perspective will be more “useful” (or at least more 
convincing) in one society or culture than in another.237 
Second, the global marketplace of ideas is a competitive one. 
Dialogue is not simply about “global solidarity” that arrives at 
a “universal ‘law of humanity.’”238 Rather than leading toward 
a communitarian Galaxia that marks the end point of the Isaac 
Asimov Foundation novels,239 the global discourse over hate 
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speech regulation is better seen as an endless discussion. Dur-
ing this discussion, some ideas will be dominant for a time; 
then they will be challenged and replaced by other ideas. And 
make no mistake, the American free speech canon has been 
very popular over the past half century. But Flemming Rose’s 
ability to construct an extended defense of his decision to run 
the Danish cartoons without more than scarcely mentioning it 
raises doubts about the supposedly hegemonic position of the 
American canon in the global free speech debate. It also raises 
deeper doubts about whether free speech discourse will ever 
“culminate” in a hegemonic, universal singularity—a doctrinal 
black hole so powerful that divergent views no longer escape.240 
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